Mental image
A mental image according to the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and cognitive science, is an experience that, in most cases, closely resembles the experience of "perceiving" an object, event, or scene but happens when the relevant object, event, or scene is not actually present to the senses.[1][2][3][4] Mental imagery can occasionally be dynamic, phantasmagoric, and involuntary, frequently presenting identifiable objects or actions, spilling over from waking events, or defying perception, presenting a kaleidoscopic field in which no distinct object can be discerned. This is especially true when falling asleep (hypnagogic imagery) and waking up (hypnopompic imagery).[5] Sometimes the effects of mental images are identical to those of the imagined behaviour or experience..[6]
In philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and, more recently, neuroscience, the nature of these experiences, what makes them possible, and their function (if any) have long been the focus of study and debate. According to modern scholars, information from every source of sensory input can be included in mental images or imagery; for example, one may encounter auditory images,[7] images of smells,[8] and so on, but most philosophical and scientific studies on the subject concentrate on visual mental imagery. It has occasionally been believed that certain animals have the same mental imagery as humans.[9] It has been challenging to determine whether or not non-human animals experience mental images because the phenomenon is essentially introspective (reflective).
Early experimental psychologists like Wilhelm Wundt and William James, as well as philosophers like George Berkeley and David Hume, saw ideas as mental images in general. Nowadays, a lot of imagery is thought to serve as mental representations (or mental models), which are crucial for memory and cognition.[10][11][12][13] According to William Brant (2013, p. 12), the term "mental images" was first used in science in a speech titled "Scientific Use of the Imagination" by John Tyndall in 1870. According to others, images are best understood as a type of interior, mental, or brain representation by definition.[14][15] Others disagree with the idea that any such mental or brain representation could be the same as (or directly generated by) the picture experience,[16][17][18][19][20][21] but fail to consider the non-representational forms of imagery.
References
- ↑ McKellar, 1957
- ↑ Richardson, 1969
- ↑ Finke, 1989
- ↑ Thomas, 2003
- ↑ Wright, Edmond (1983). "Inspecting images". Philosophy. 58 (223): 57–72 (see pp. 68–72). doi:10.1017/s0031819100056266. S2CID 170522026.Wright, Edmond (1983). "Inspecting images". Philosophy. 58 (223): 57–72 (see pp. 68–72). doi:10.1017/s0031819100056266. S2CID 170522026.
- ↑ Kappes, Heather Barry; Morewedge, Carey K. (2016-07-01). "Mental Simulation as Substitute for Experience" (PDF). Social and Personality Psychology Compass. 10 (7): 405–420. doi:10.1111/spc3.12257. ISSN 1751-9004. S2CID 4823141.Kappes, Heather Barry; Morewedge, Carey K. (2016-07-01). "Mental Simulation as Substitute for Experience" (PDF). Social and Personality Psychology Compass. 10 (7): 405–420. doi:10.1111/spc3.12257. ISSN 1751-9004. S2CID 4823141.
- ↑ Reisberg, 1992
- ↑ Bensafi et al., 2003
- ↑ Aristotle: On the Soul III.3 428a
- ↑ Pavio, 1986
- ↑ Egan, 1992
- ↑ Barsalou, 1999
- ↑ Prinz, 2002
- ↑ Block, 1983
- ↑ Kosslyn, 1983
- ↑ Sartre, 1940
- ↑ Ryle, 1949
- ↑ Skinner, 1974
- ↑ Thomas, 1999
- ↑ Bartolomeo, 2002
- ↑ Bennett & Hacker, 2003